Prosecuting Aggression

The Assembly of States Parties to the International Criminal Court will soon have its first opportunity to revise the Rome Statute and activate the latent crime of aggression, which awaits a definition of its elements and conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction. The working group charged with drafting a provision is scheduled to complete its task by 2008 or 2009, one year before the International Criminal Court’s first review conference. Beginning with a history of the crime meant to put the current negotiations in the context of past initiatives, this article sets out the status of the negotiations and begins to forecast prosecutorial challenges created by alternative formulations. It concludes by identifying the main prosecutorial challenges common to all formulations to see how a case against a political or military leader for the crime of aggression will look

Bargaining Practices: Negotiating the Kampala Compromise for the International Criminal Court

At the International Criminal Court\u27s (ICC) Review Conference in 2010, the ICC\u27s Assembly of States Parties (ASP) agreed upon a definition of the crime of aggression, jurisdictional conditions, and a mechanism for its entry into force (the Kampala Compromise ). These amendments give the ICC jurisdiction to prosecute political and military leaders of states for planning, preparing, initiating, or executing illegal wars, beginning as early as January 2017. This article explains the bargaining practices of the diplomats that gave rise to this historic development in international law. This article argues that the international-practices framework, as currently conceived, does not adequately capture the role sincerity played in the negotiations. Sincerity was an international practice, but not a performance. It follows that the international practices framework should be adjusted to accommodate the decisive role of sincerity, a special nonperformative international practice, in the face-to-face interactions of international politics and diplomacy. The remainder of the article lays out the international-practices framework and explains the place of performances within it. The article then introduces the concept of sincerity as a social practice. The second half of the article discusses some ways that sincerity played a role in the negotiations. The article concludes that sincerity is a special kind of international practice: It cannot be a performance, but it can be an international practice, and an effective one at that

The Reason Behind the Rules: From Description to Normativity in International Criminal Procedure

As the International Criminal Court (ICC) continues to mature in its practices, it provokes discussion on whether the comfortable framework of adversarial and inquisitorial systems should be used to evaluate an institution that exists in a fundamentally different context from that of national criminal justice systems. In order to avoid entangling the ICC in rules that are not tailored to fit its specific goals and institutional context, the normative purposes underlying procedural rules derived from domestic institutions should be reexamined. This article draws out basic principles that may be of use in reexamining the reasoning behind the rules of procedure in international criminal law. It departs from trends in current scholarship that attempt to apply the methods of comparative law to a study of international criminal procedure. It concludes by urging comparative scholars to redirect their focus from describing the procedural features of the emerging international system to engaging with the more fundamental question of what those features ought to be

The Mens Rea of the Crime of Aggression

This article, written in commemoration of the tenth anniversary of the International Criminal Court (ICC), explores the mens rea of the crime of aggression. The definition and jurisdictional conditions of the crime of aggression was recently incorporated into the ICC’s Rome Statute, thereby reviving a crime used during the Nuremberg trials to prosecute Nazi leaders after World War II. Mens rea is an important, even central, consideration when judging whether a defendant has satisfied all of the elements of the crime of aggression. The starting point for this exploration of the mens rea of the crime of aggression is its elements. The elements are an official ICC document clarifying the culpable mental state that applies to each aspect of the conduct, consequences, and circumstances constituting the crime. Mens rea can also come into play in differing ways in an aggression case through several defenses. A number of defenses are contained in Part 3 of the Rome Statute, the general section applicable to all ICC crimes. Ultimately, judges are being asked to chart a new course. It will be up to them, hearing concrete aggression cases and reasoning from existing jurisprudence, to keep the mens rea elements within the bounds of contemporary criminal law and to ensure that the fledgling crime accords with evolving notions of culpability

Conceptualizing Aggression

The special working group tasked by the International Criminal Court’s Assembly of States Parties to define the supreme international crime, the crime of aggression, has produced a breakthrough draft definition. This paper analyzes the key concepts that make up the emerging definition of the crime of aggression by developing and applying a future-oriented methodology that brings together scenario planning and grounded theory. It proposes modifications and interpretations of the constituent concepts of the crime of aggression intended to make the definition sociologically relevant today and in the foreseeable future

Judging Aggression

One of the most polarizing debates in international law is how the goal of peace should figure into the work of international criminal tribunals. The freshly minted crime of aggression lands the judges of the International Criminal Court in the middle of the peace versus justice dilemma and will challenge the court to prove its value for advancing peace in appropriate circumstances while building the rule of law and maintaining its legitimacy. This article, the final installment in the author\u27s trilogy on the crime of aggression, explores the gaps, ambiguities and contradictions woven into the definition of the crime and evaluates the range of ways in which well-intentioned international judges might attempt to do justice while promoting peace through decisional law focusing on three of international law s\u27 most controversial questions: the scope of self-defense, the status of humanitarian intervention under the UN Charter and the character of an armed attack. Ultimately, this article argues for a richer understanding of the concepts of peace and justice that will permit international judges to punish aggression while promoting peace

Who’s Afraid of the Lucky MOOSE? Canada’s Dangerous Self-Defence Innovation

With little public discussion, the Canadian law of self-defence has become, in important respects, more permissive than Florida’s Stand Your Ground law. This article provides original historical research into the origins of the Canadian law of self-defence that reveals the evolution of its current conceptual features. It compares these features with the features of the Florida law and warns that in climates of fear, despite Canadian safeguards, Canada’s law is vulnerable to biased or unprincipled application. The Gerald Stanley case in Battleford Saskatchewan serves as a warning. The author argues that Stanley’s successful accident defence in the homicide of Colten Boushie was, in fact, predicated on dangerous notions of defence of property and defence of person that prioritize the protection of property, liberty, and honour over human life.Alors qu’il a peu été le sujet de débats publics, le droit canadien à l’autodéfense est devenu à bien des égards plus permissif que la loi de la Floride « Stand Your Ground » ou « Défendez votre territoire ». Cet article présente une recherche historique originale portant sur les origines de la loi canadienne sur l’auto-défense et qui révèle l’évolution de ses aspects conceptuels actuels. Il compare ces aspects avec ceux de la loi floridienne et nous met en garde contre les climats de peur qui, malgré les balises canadiennes, rendent les lois canadiennes vulnérables à des applications biaisées ou non raisonnées. Le cas de Gerald Stanley à Battleford en Saskatchewan sert à illustrer la mise en garde. L’auteur soumet que le succès de la défense d’accident de Stanley dans l’homicide de Colten Boushie reposait en fait sur les notions dangereuses de défense de propriété et de défense des personnes, faisant ainsi primer la protection de la propriété, de la liberté et de l’honneur sur celle de la vie humaine

Self-Defense in Climates of Fear

Climates of fear—depleted inner cities, segregated rural communities, contested international hotspots—strain the law of self-defense, affecting legislation, policing, prosecution, and adjudication. There are distributional implications to our legislative and judicial choices, justifying or excusing some uses of deadly force but not others, making some segments of the population safer and others less so. Florida’s “Stand Your Ground” law, Canada’s “Lucky Moose” law, and the international law of self-defence provide three revealing examples. Our doctrinal preferences correspond with the cases and incidents that have most left their mark on us. As such, the law of self-defense is haunted by projections, pre-conceived notions about the world related to our past experiences rather than the situation at hand. This article, based on the author’s keynote lecture at the 2017 McGill Law Graduate conference, considers the challenge that fear poses to the law of self-defence.Les climats de peur ‒ les centres-villes appauvris, les communautés rurales isolées, les points chauds internationaux contestés ‒ mettent à mal le droit de la légitime défense, affectant la législation, les politiques publiques, les poursuites et les jugements. Nos choix législatifs et judiciaires ont des implications en termes de distribution, justifiant ou excusant certains emplois de la force létale, mais pas d’autres, rendant certaines couches de la population plus sûres et d’autres moins. La loi floridienne « Stand Your Ground », la loi canadienne « Lucky Moose » et le droit international de la légitime défense fournissent trois exemples révélateurs. Nos préférences doctrinales correspondent aux cas et incidents qui nous ont le plus marqués. En tant que telle, la loi sur la légitime défense est hantée par des projections, des notions préconçues sur le monde, liées à nos expériences passées plutôt qu’à la situation actuelle. Cet article, basé sur la conférence magistrale de l’auteur au colloque des cycles supérieurs en droit de McGill en 2017, examine le défi que la peur pose au droit de la légitime défense.Ambientes de miedo – centros urbanos empobrecidos, comunidades rurales segregadas, brotes de contestación internacional – presionan el derecho a la defensa propia, afectando la legislación, la policía, el enjuiciamiento y las sentencias judiciales. Esto tiene implicaciones distributivas para nuestra organización legislativa y judicial, ya que justifica o excusa ciertos usos letales de la fuerza mientas que otros no, de tal forma que algunos segmentos de la población se sienten más seguros que otros. La ley “Stand Your Groud” en Florida, la ley “Lucky Moose” en Canadá y el derecho a la defensa propia en derecho público internacional son tres ejemplos reveladores. Al respecto, nuestras referencias doctrinales corresponden a los casos e incidentes que más nos han marcado. Por lo tanto, el derecho a la defensa propia se encuentra atormentado por proyecciones y nociones preconcebidas sobre experiencias pasadas, en vez de la situación actual. Este artículo, basado en una conferencia magistral pronunciada en 2017 por el autor en el coloquio del posgrado en derecho de McGill, explora el desafío que representa el miedo para el derecho a la defensa propia

Self-Defense in Climates of Fear

Climates of fear— depleted inner cities, segregated rural communities, contested international hotspots— strain the law of self-defense, affecting legislation, policing, prosecution, and adjudication. There are distributional implications to our legislative and judicial choices, justifying or excusing some uses of deadly force but not others, making some segments of the population safer and others less so. Florida’s “ Stand Your Ground” law, Canada’s “ Lucky Moose” law, and the international law of self-defence provide three revealing examples. Our doctrinal preferences correspond with the cases and incidents that have most left their mark on us. As such, the law of self-defense is haunted by projections, pre-conceived notions about the world related to our past experiences rather than the situation at hand. This article, based on the author’s keynote lecture at the 2017 McGill Law Graduate conference, considers the challenge that fear poses to the law of self-defence.Les climats de peur ‒ les centres-villes appauvris, les communautés rurales isolées, les points chauds internationaux contestés ‒ mettent à mal le droit de la légitime défense, affectant la législation, les politiques publiques, les poursuites et les jugements. Nos choix législatifs et judiciaires ont des implications en termes de distribution, justifiant ou excusant certains emplois de la force létale, mais pas d''autres, rendant certaines couches de la population plus sûres et d'autres moins. La loi floridienne « Stand Your Ground », la loi canadienne « Lucky Moose » et le droit international de la légitime défense fournissent trois exemples révélateurs. Nos préférences doctrinales correspondent aux cas et incidents qui nous ont le plus marqués. En tant que telle, la loi sur la légitime défense est hantée par des projections, des notions préconçues sur le monde, liées à nos expériences passées plutôt qu'à la situation actuelle. Cet article, basé sur la conférence magistrale de l'auteur au colloque des cycles supérieurs en droit de McGill en 2017, examine le défi que la peur pose au droit de la légitime défense.Ambientes de miedo – centros urbanos empobrecidos, comunidades rurales segregadas, brotes de contestación internacional – presionan el derecho a la defensa propia, afectando la legislación, la policía, el enjuiciamiento y las sentencias judiciales. Esto tiene implicaciones distributivas para nuestra organización legislativa y judicial, ya que justifica o excusa ciertos usos letales de la fuerza mientas que otros no, de tal forma que algunos segmentos de la población se sienten más seguros que otros. La ley “ Stand Your Groud” en Florida, la ley “ Lucky Moose” en Canadá y el derecho a la defensa propia en derecho público internacional son tres ejemplos reveladores. Al respecto, nuestras referencias doctrinales corresponden a los casos e incidentes que más nos han marcado. Por lo tanto, el derecho a la defensa propia se encuentra atormentado por proyecciones y nociones preconcebidas sobre experiencias pasadas, en vez de la situación actual. Este artículo, basado en una conferencia magistral pronunciada en 2017 por el autor en el coloquio del posgrado en derecho de McGill, explora el desafío que representa el miedo para el derecho a la defensa propia.Weisbord Noah. Self-Defense in Climates of Fear. In: Revue Québécoise de droit international, Hors-série décembre 2019 – Governing Our Commons: What Matters to Us Today. pp. 11-18

The Law and Ethics in Gacaca: balancing Justice and Healing in post-genocide Rwanda

Rushing waters pour down the bills like waterfalls and cleave massive ruts into the red clay surface of the road to Gishamvu during the rainy season. In the dry season, the scarred surface hardens, and a layer of dust rises from tires and wind in a murky red mist. The narrow road, eut aggressively up the mountain, is precarious. A bridge over a small stream is littered with broken logs used to patch gaping holes that trap the tires of passing trucks. The bridge barely holds its banks. At a crossroads, up a steep slope, sits a monument to the Virgin Mary. Colorfully dressed women walk slowly up the scorched hill, heavy loads on their heads, sorne with a baby or a small child wrapped tightly against their backs. Men with farm implements kick the dust on their way to Gishamvu.f